A requiem for the Libyan revolt?
While hoping not to go out this way, certainly in this country, the picture changed. Gaddafi in Benghazi march on and has "cleaned up" the west coast. A revolt in early apparently unstoppable now is faced with the prospect of defeat and the most cruel repression. Cynically speaking, the colonel had the good sense to use the sea of \u200b\u200bmoney on which to base sailing armed force of his regime on the bodies of chosen members of his tribe and a robust body of foreign mercenaries armed and very well paid .
There is no secret that the Libyan rebels on their own - at least that is without adequate supplies of arms and ammunition - do not make it. Theoretical assumption of a direct intervention of imperialist powers it already has expressed in the negative and motivated. But the rebels need outside help, otherwise Gaddafi wins. There remains the question of what should be done in this situation? Beyond the existence of repeated verbal and more options, and voids Gaddafi calls because if they go, the imperialist powers are not going. So avoid mixing more trouble. We also understand the reason for inaction, beyond French diplomatic initiative which resulted in the recognition of the revolutionary council of Benghazi (unilateral initiative by the taste of booking petrilifere concessions in case of victory, or resistance, the rebels, but nothing more ).
already engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan, the powers Westerners do not feel (and affordable) to open a third front, knowing that a victory Gaddafi will present the bill to those who have "dropped out" after having done business with him and cuddled him. Under the overall attitude of these powers, and the things they said and not said, it may be that some factors are in play, without which we understand very little: the distrust of the rebels Libyans which not much is known and they belong to a world strongly tribalization (at the risk of a repeat of the chaos of Somalia), the presumption / hope that the crisis is over Libyan oil prices normalize, and finally the interest to have someone willing to be the oppressive (but useful ) guardian the south coast in an anti-immigration into Europe.
At the bottom is yet another demonstration of how to dictators imperialism of a certain color, even though sons of bitches are always "their" sons of bitches, and how to be more "profitable" that bourgeois democracy remains confined to the "first world" and human rights are an excuse for cost effective operations.
This criticism is not necessarily inconsistent with the negative opinion about the direct intervention of the West, if we proceed in the direction of an answer to the question about "what to do." In fact, the collective subject capable of acting, and which could be given the necessary support, there would be: the Arab League. This body has asked the UN to end the establishment of a no-fly zone . This initiative is not reducible to the mere declaration of disqualification of an air space, because without a prompt and adequate military preparedness - destroying radar systems and contrarei and operational capacity of local aviation - all would have no effect. But I still do not understand those who should provide? Perhaps the West? A further demonstration of hypocrisy, because before that the UN is moving (and we have always known that the UN only moves to quell the riots, not to encourage them), and that after his "way" they do the enforcement, Gaddafi has already won.
In reality very little if the scandal at the Arab League had decided to arrange itself to the task, getting all the information deemed necessary by the West to prepare for the no-fly zone . And in practice you could give the executive post to Egypt, with a respectable air force. Same time should not be difficult to supply arms to the rebels quickly they need, because if it is the air force Tripoli to "soften" positions, specifically are armed with Gaddafi to conquer them. But you can safely bet that this will not happen. The consequences will not be limited to Libya or vindictive reactions of Gaddafi outside of his country, but the very fact of his victory would have serious consequences and negative in countries - such as Yemen, for example - where for weeks they start looking to send home the local dictator. Libya will be the rock on which we will break the wave of Arab rebellion, as a whole and in its dangerous dynamic has never been frowned upon by the West?
Reflections provisional (perhaps) on any opportunities "democratic" in Arab countries released.
In earlier correspondence, there was talk of the absence, in the short to medium term prospects for social revolution (in the strict sense) in Arab countries where the revolt was successful and in those where it is still in progress. They seem to be in place formal processes for the establishment of representative democracy of the bourgeois type, perhaps the most effective systems put in place by false or depose deposed dictators. Better than nothing, you might say, and remain in the those in favor (as the writer) to what was once called "direct democracy" (also known by the Greek Communists in the last century "laocrazia). Certainly the advent of representative democracy is an improvement over the tyrannical and bloodthirsty Arab autocracies, however, even from the standpoint of the revolutionary left it well-known shortcomings, limitations and even dangers for the emancipation of the people. The fact remains that not all systems in category "representative democracy" are equal: some are better, others worse.
At this point some observations are required (both although brief) on some fundamental problems that have to do heavy political processes in the Arab world - regardless of the factor "Islamic radicalism" - taking into account a key element: representative democracy contradicts itself (that is pure front) When there is no respect for opponents (enemies you could make a separate discussion) and space for the so-called "political discourse". In language that means less dignified than taking a sledgehammer to the road (or worse) opponent is out of the normal democratic logic. Thus, the manifestation of Cairo women on 8 March, interrupted by a horde of men threatening and ready to use their hands, not a good prerequisite for the emergence of a state of affairs different from the past ..
We come now to the rest of the problems in the field. The first question is that in the two countries freed of their dictator, it has succeeded thanks to the attitude taken by their hosts (as they were military dictators extraction, past the barracks of the presidential palace). Think of a future free from political claims of the military seems a bit 'risky, particularly in Egypt (but not exclusively), where generals and senior officers also run a major economic power, largely autonomous. Policy to solve the equation in a near future it is a factor M of a certain weight.
But there are other unknowns, and come from the socio / cultural needs of the various Arab countries. First, it must be a common element to both the dictatorships and corrupt at the top of the bourgeois democracies: the repressive apparatus, that is, not ever play a unique role in maintaining "order", for there is an additional tool by the importance not negligible, whose name is maintaining the population in the cultural degradation and / or obscurantism. And this is a situation defined mass.
Note then that - for better or for worse - representative democracy (array bourgeois, let us not forget) is based sull'atomizzazione individual. Also present are the pages of Marx on the meaning of metaphor for social / economic myth of the "noble savage" coined in the early stage of capitalism. It does not seem right that it operates in Arab societies. This leads us to a figure that would not be specific to the Arab world if there is not presented with a particular quantitative and qualitative significance: it is the particular inhomogeneities inside those companies, although these collective realities different to each other if viewed individually in a comprehensive manner. It is not, Certainly, a unique feature in this part of the world, presenting each company within it uneven so more or less. Just think of the effect of regional differences on economic, social and cultural diversity among major cities, provincial towns and countryside, as well as the interrelationships between all these factors.
inhomogeneities in the Arab world are expressing the co-existence of social reality (with all that the word implies) even for belonging to what we Westerners would different historical periods. Or express the mixture in individual sectors of society, elements defined situations and is typical of both XX and XXI centuries of previous centuries, a "past" still, you might say. We must stop the existing urban diversity, for example, between the Yemeni and Syrian Damascus, Sanaa, as insignificant, but it must be highlighted as reporting socio / economic type "medieval" (to understand the good) and the corresponding cultural horizons not only exist in the countryside, the mountains or in the oases, but also within large urban settings (such as Cairo, Algiers or Rabat). These social relations belong to the archaic tribalism and / or forms of patronage 'parafeudale "economically and politically. To this, add the very strong constraints that are dependent on people from the family (rarely mononuclear) and the clan to which the family belongs. And families and clans in some Arab societies are still part of a tribe. All these arrangements produce a pyramidal structure of the company at its apex facing the privileged classes, remained unchanged in Tunisia as in Egypt.
A new element (but still not be determined by weight) showed today by the large number of young people whose horizons have been expanded in some way by the use of modern information technologies and communication. Here is an unknown factor X that might be relevant, at least in terms potential. The phenomenon needs to be monitored carefully, since Arab societies - unlike European ones - form a majority made up of young people. Take Saudi Arabia (which we reserve the right to speak in the next match with greater amplitude), where 60% of the population is under 30 years, the average age is 19 years young, the use of Internet in 2010 has been an increase of 240% and affects at least 3 million people.
And last but not least there are closures and religious fanaticism, not to assimilate usual obscurantist Islamic radicalism and bomber . This refers to a factor Specifically, the "traditional" so to speak, read in the light of the principle: "Maybe religion is not necessarily the opium of the people, but taken in large doses is very bad, who hires her and her neighbor." It is a factor that not only Muslims but also some Christian minorities. The Arab countries to have these religious minorities are a few I find Palestine, Syria, Iraq (perhaps not for long) and Egypt (here it is even 10% of the population). Just live together in Egypt two closures religious: the Muslim (well known) and the Coptic, much less known but no less tough. If in the last days of fighting in Cairo were seen side by side in Tahrir Square Coptic crosses and Korans, Recently we had, always a popular neighborhood in Cairo, a thwarted love story between a young Copt and a Muslim youth led to riots that took part in hundreds and hundreds of people, the beauty of finished with 14 deaths and several hundred wounded. Another bad sign.
This accumulation of factors is of such magnitude as to show the very difficult path to democratic systems / representative as we understand them in Europe. Depending on the forces that prevail, at the most likely scenarios are that of "totalitarian democracy" prevailed if the closure of a religious, authoritarian, and that of parliamentary systems, particularly so if the military would lay their mortgage on the current political processes. With the addition that no change in the structure of the privileged classes (the majority or agricultural pests or comprador bourgeoisie ), regardless of "who" they are composed, in both cases the persistence of widespread corruption would be anything but surprising. With all that follows.
Breaking dictators is never easy, but at some point it becomes possible, and in different sizes companies freed them of what is not possible overnight. Moreover, there is always the risk that the momentum of popular off (even for the people there the difficulty of the transition from the condition of his subjects than of citizens) and the disappointment of mass re-open the way for tomorrow's autocrats.
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