Saudi Arabia and Syria (March 17, 2011)
obscurantism absolutism of Saudi Arabia
is a state known for being one of the biggest oil producers, to have a absolutist monarchy of the most obscurantist, because of relegating women to a subordination and exclusion unworthy (even common sense), for the extraordinary richness of the kings and sheikhs - matched only by their insensibiltà social - and to be an important and staunch ally of Washington in the area (which, collectively, is perhaps the lesser of two evils Saudis). In this sparsely populated country, the birthplace of the Prophet of Islam, a land of deserts and Bedouin, one can say something else, usually omitted from the mass media (mis) information to ground (for that is that playing oil interests and American interests).
Saudi Again this is explained by its past, which are pivotal moments in the eighteenth century and after the Great War of '14-'18. The temporal distance is irrelevant, because the line of continuity that links the ancient to contemporary events. However, in 1744 we created a strategic alliance - never broken - among the Bedouin of the Saud dynasty and a kind of "restorer the original purity of Islam "by the name of Muhammad Ibn Adb al-Whhab. The latter, inspired by the content developed in the thirteenth century of our law school was a Muslim, became a preacher of quite restrictive and puritanical interpretation of the Koran and Islamic law, called Wahhabi , by force of arms. At that time, the Wahhabis were soundly defeated, but they were not destroyed, neither the family nor the Saudi's accession to the movement (religious and legal at the same time). The return of offensive and vindictive Saud Arab came on the scene after the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire in 1918, and had its key moment in the hunt Mecca by Sheriff Hussein Ibn Ali, the Hashemite family, and then a descendant of the Prophet. The winners took over almost the entire Arabian peninsula, they imposed their beliefs and Ibn Saud became the first monarch of Saudi Arabia Wahhabi. Namely (and this is important) the first Islamic state definable (depending on the conceptual system to which they adhere) fundamentalist, fundamentalist, radical and obscurantist from the Middle Ages and so on.
The discovery of huge oil fields meant that the Saudis, by the lords of a box of sand of little importance (not least because of the closed northern dynasties enemy of the Hashemite Transjordan and Iraq, and south by the British possedimentri) became strategically important for U.S. imperialism. The flood of wealth - which affected mainly the royal family, the large (22,000 members) to be comparable to a legion (parasites) - for a long time did not change significantly the culture and mentality of archaic and closed corner of the world. That is a Bedouin society for centuries been very connected to the outside. On the difficulties faced by Ibn Saud - the oil boom - in order to avoid violent reactions against the advent of popular events as the evil phone and the radio there is a vast anecdotal. Vale is worth recalling that dramatic events related inauguration of the first Saudi English-language TV channel led to the killing of King Faisal in the mid 70s. The backwardness is largely remained, regardless of the subsequent and massive introduction of modern technology, with huge levels of corruption. But this is not to make Saudi Arabia a persistent source of danger to the world. It is the fact that it has been funding a full blast construction of mosques and Koranic schools, and the maintenance of its
Wahhabi imams belief where there are Muslim communities, thus spreading one of the most reactionary, obscurantist version of Islam and inhuman - first mostly confined to the Arabian peninsula - to the entire area of \u200b\u200bMuslim presence in the world, including West. That in a nutshell, if Wahhabism was dominant in the Muslim period of expansion out of the peninsula, now no one speaks about the glories of Islamic civilization to the Ottomans. It is therefore not without meaning the percentage of Saudis risen to international fame as an active Islamic terrorists (actually it is also the significant presence of the Egyptians, but they cause the profile it deserves a separate discussion). Much of what is rarely discussed, as well as the "mystery" continuation of support to the U.S. Saudi regime. Perhaps it is a mystery less mysterious than what the logic man in the street would. Of the reasons we must be even, since no doubt that the top political and military are well aware of the U.S. subversive role of Saudi Wahhabism, and do not miss significant apology "humanitarian" to assimilate the kingdom to "rogue states" of bushiana memory. Obviously there are reasons "superior" for not making Saudi Arabia the end of Iraq, especially now that it too is full of oil, and coined the motto could be applied - with undeniable political sensitivity - the soldiers Use during the first Gulf War: Their
kick ass and take Their gas (from a kick in the ass and take their oil).
For the Wahhabi kingdom, however, this does not happen. If we go a bit 'back in time we find the crucial role of the United States own instrumental in the activation of radical Islam, initially used against the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. Then this kind of "Frankenstein monster" at the end (as expected) has shifted from the control of the godfather stars and stripes, but it continued its usefulness to U.S. interests as an excuse for intervention in Afghanistan for the policy in Iraq oltrecché for support for dictatorial Arab regimes (with the justification for their role as a barrier against radical Islam for its alleged secularism). And if you can then say that a certain rate of Islamic radicalism is served imperialism, should be mentioned that Saudi Arabia plays an objective role antiraniano Sunni in the Persian Gulf.
Today winds begin to blow, even rebellion against the absolute monarchy of Saud, though last Friday, March 11 - predicted by opponents of the regime as "Angry" - has been solved in a flop. However it is still early to venture any prediction as to the course of events, and it is better simply to understand what the socio-political situation in this monarchy. So far the U.S. seems to worry about, so much so that Obama has asked Congress to sell Saudi Arabia over the next 20 years, weapons for 60 million dollars (including 84 fighters F-15). The Saudis are also the pillars of Islamic purity, however, the action taken by King Abdullah at Obama in order to prevent the fall of Mubarak make it clear what their state of worry, and also their concern about a decline in the U.S. in the region, infidels who are the Yankees . So far more than Washington on the issue of Iran's atomic project in the eyes of Saud has shown himself weak, having taken on the Saudi insistence for a military attack on Iran. Perhaps that is a loss of confidence in the U.S. in January this year was taken on a soft attitude in the face of signs of opening up the Iranian foreign minister Ali Akbar Salehi.
is not known the extent of the poor in Saudi Arabia, but he is young - about 60%, it was discussed in previous correspondence - have a greater latitude of the horizon of knowledge. Women are about half of 25 million, seven hundred population. Annually knock on the door of the labor market at least 280,000 and 270,000 young girls, but youth unemployment is high, and for those who can not find work there is an average salary of $ 830. Nothing compared to the amount of the monthly salary of 8,000 princes of royal blood: about $ 250,000.
King Abdullah tries to pose as a reformer in the face of demands - from the young and a bit ' of older people - those common to other parts of the Arab world. Known exponent of this trend is the thirty-three Khulood entrepreneur Salah al-Fahad who sent the king a petition which claims a free and dignified life in harmony with the most developed societies in the world, in terms of democracy and respect for human rights, and 14-point ask themselves create jobs, eradicate poverty through more equitable distribution of wealth, incentives for 'purchase of houses, fighting corruption, end the sectarian and tribal strife, release of some 8,000 political prisoners, equal rights of women including access to political life. And of course the move towards a constitutional monarchy, rule of law as structured by classical separation of three powers. On the country's political stability is an increased risk falls from above the King 87 years and Crown Prince - Sultan - in addition to having 83 suffers from Alzheimer's! The conflict over the succession in the large group of suitors could throw the kingdom into a civil war in many fronts, and then into chaos with disastrous effects on global oil markets.
Let's see what will be the development of the situation of discontent from below, and palace intrigues. Perhaps the King will start immediately for a sweetener, with no effects on the structures of the country, but perhaps demagogic effective in the short time and devote more care to more repressive apparatus. Road that others are already taking: we learn that the Omani government has given 400 dollars to each employee and promised 50,000 new jobs, the King of Bahrain has pledged 50,000 new homes, and Algeria has increased by 50% the salary of the policemen even with retroactive effect to time from 2008 (! ).
But it also followed closely what happens between the Saudi monarchy and the Shiite minority, which the projection of Iranian influence is far from theoretical. Saudi Arabia's Shiite Muslims are a minority discriminated against, but form a majority in the Eastern Province, to the place where the higher the oil resources. And remember that even the majority Shiite population Bahrain in riot (there are also Shiites in the Arab Emirates, and Yemen are 46%). The real danger from below for the monarchy is just the Shiite areas if they act as a rebel and-trailer on the discontent of the Sunni population, could trigger a profound crisis. In these areas a widespread agitation is taking place, and reckless actions could strengthen the forces of repression and even extend them. Among the consequences of imperialism are most interested are the increases in oil prices, provided for in that case between 20 and 25%.
Obviously if in Bahrain King Hamad bin Issa al-Khalifa was forced to constitutional amendments required the majority of the people, there would be repercussions in the neighboring Saudi Arabia, as well as in other Gulf countries. The same thing that King Abdullah is well aware, so much so that on March 14 thousand troops entered Saudi Arabia in Bahrain at the request of local government under the guise of aid mission in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), a body which includes Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman and Bahrain. The latter country's largest Shia party - the Wefaq - spoke of an act of war and occupation. We'll see. However, it is certain that this military intervention has several meanings: first, internal political spheres, as a signal of the monarchs in the area meaning that there will be pressure on political and social changes of the streets, and that the results will not be repeated in Tunisia and Egypt, also with regard to foreign policy, it is a signal to Iran in the sense that local governments will do everything possible to ensure that the collected Shia in the Gulf will not prevail. And as a final remark one could mention the success of teaching arising from the reaction of Gaddafi against his people in revolt.
The imperialist governments, for their part, can not think of the broad effects radius is derivable from the destabilization of the Saudi monarchy is the other part of the peninsula, you want to explode dynastic problems, want to Shiite unrest and / or subjects Sunnis tired of the regime. In the U.S. interests are enormous and compounded by Iran-syndrome. Consider that if the Saudi kingdom's importance to Washington that we have described, there are close to the U.S. presence in the key: as Oman, Bahrain (where there is a large naval base), Kuwait (where it is installed logistics center to support operations in Iraq) and Qatar (where it counts the U.S. Central Command and a major air base).
major disruptions in Saudi Arabia would create a situation conducive to the spread Iranian influence in the area, but not all. To be clear, objective interests to address any (and maybe hoped for), empty of the U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf are owned by large and emerging politico / economic three continents: China, India, Russia and Brazil. The same reality - when you say the case! - Who showed no interest in creating an effective front against Gaddafi.
Qqui are at stake interests of regional powers that - beyond the direct intervention of dangerous - do not leave in tragic solitude willing angry masses of poorly armed, denture to overthrow the Saudi dynasty and that of Bahrain. The area is geo-strategic crucial, both because of the possibility of energy resources is essential to control the crossing points of the global maritime trade, which are the Suez Canal and the Straits of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb. So far the United States - bogged down in Iraq and Afhanistan, without a voice to the Palestinian problem deepened, with no prospects on the Iranian nuclear issue beyond a devastating military intervention by the unexpected results - the Arabs have witnessed the events without knowing " which way to turn. " It remains to be seen how they will act to protect their interests in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf. And finally there is the unknown in Israel, an ally of Saudi Arabia has done: if there there was a regime change with the Zionist state would be hostile countries in the entire area south-east.
Even in Syria protest and die
Prior to argument, a general consideration. The formal aspect of the support of police and army in a dictatorship, in and of itself does not say much. More content is derived from the analysis instead of the ratio between the dictatorships and the indispensable man in uniform. These reports may be of various types already turbulent periods, and then emerge out clearly when the people rebelled and took to the streets defying the repressive apparatus of the regime. In these cases the active support of the police in general is not lacking, but they are low labor. The real balance of power is the army, whether they fall apart, and instead take an active role in revealing the true type of its links with the regime. This role may be to do better police and suppress the riots in the blood, or in passing from the population, or even act as final arbiter in saying "enough" to the dictator, thus forcing him to leave. In the latter two cases give the army the role of the film "good" would just childish really the right conclusion would be to say that in practice the army occupied power system in socio-economic position of its own, independent, one could say, that is not dependent on the gracious acts of the dictator. Thus, the instrumentality of the support of the army regime and non-existential identification with it. This would mean also for the people "victory", having then them do with military power. In Tunisia and Egypt has gone well, not in Libya.
It spreads the contagion of the East North Africa to Syria? The event staged March 15 in Damascus by a handful of young people do not say anything, except that it was courageous young people. But the events of March 18 in the town of Dera (on the border with Jordan) - four dead and hundreds injured at the hands of security forces - could be the beginning of a part of the Syrian Arab revolt . But overall, the local regime is presented as a tough nut to crack. The town is dominated by the party "socialist Baath (which had aroused so much hope in the middle of last century in the Arab world), and at least 30 years is in the hands of the" republican dynasty "was founded by Air Force General Hafiz al-Assad . At his death in 2000, was succeeded by his son Bashar, previously ophthalmologist in London. The Baathist slogans hailing to the "unity, freedom, socialism" is an empty phoneme not to be taken into account. Point of arrival of hordes of Western tourists and Japanese, Syria (27.7 million inhabitants) has an unemployment rate of 20%, and 8.5% of the population lives below the poverty line, since 1963 there is a state of emergency, the judiciary is not independent in its activities, the levels of corruption are high. Overall, there is a country of young people who have good schools, good universities and the massive use of modern communication technology.
In terms of socio-political would potentially a powder magazine, posing as a synthesis of all the social ills of Arab societies: a socio-economic situation of Egyptian type, the supreme power is hereditary, as in Jordan (which is at least a monarchy), and how Egypt prerivolta; apparatus enforcement is greater than Tunisians, Egyptians and Libyans put together, and as the dictatorial government of Bahrain is a religious minority: in this case involves Alawite followers of heretical Shia Muslim of ancient origin, for which the deceased Hafiz al-Assad to be well thought Ayatollah Khomeini issued a license reconnaissance of belonging to Shiism in all respects. But the country has its specificity.
The Syrian society is very composite, both religiously and ethnically. The majority of the population is Sunni Muslim, but the power of the Alawi is, there are minorities and crisitiane Coptic Orthodox (Christmas is a national holiday), in addition to the Syrian native (so to speak) there are Kurdish, Turkoman and Circassian. Of course, in such a situation, the technique of divide and rule is used by the Baathist regime with the wisdom of one who has behind him centuries of absolute power management.
There are Islamic radicals, namely the Brotherhood Muslims, who at the moment seems little able to harm as a result of events in the city of Hama in 1982, almost forgotten in the West. At that time the Muslim Brotherhood chose the dangerous path of armed attacks and actions, and just in Hama had their largest operations center and spread. In this situation, Hafiz al-Hassad - called "the lion of Damascus" - did not just roar and sent the army into the city to make a clean sweep of the fundamentalists. After three days of indiscriminate bombing, substantial destruction of Hama and killed at least 30,000 of each sex and age, the Muslim Brotherhood was silenced.
The fact is that Syria's army, which is also entrenched in the hands Allawi (along with security services), is completely identified with the regime, the military as such is privileged and well aware that a successful rescue would lead to a Sunni bloodbath Alawite. Moreover, the prospect of a fall of the regime - as well as not finding an enthusiastic non-Muslim minorities, for obvious reasons - is viewed with fear even middle-class and popular sectors of Syrian society because of political and social disorder that would ensue. Plays a lot in this, the experience gathered from hundreds of thousands of Iraqi refugees fled to Syria after the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003.
The strength of the system (at least to date) derives not only from the strength and efficiency of the security services and army, but also by the fact that, unlike Mubarak, Assad did not commit the error (from the perspective of a dictatorship) to leave space for civil society: therefore, nothing more or less independent newspapers, no independent trade unions are able to carve out margins, no non-governmental organizations, the closure of a discussion forum. Large forces of opposition does not seem to be there. Today the Muslim Brotherhood is considered weak, and the Kurds - whose ability to mobilize itself there - still remember how their agitations were harshly repressed by Bashar al-Assad.
Recently, a Portuguese newspaper devoted to Syria an article entitled "There will be a Damascus Spring", which is only realistic if the immediate reported. In the mean time it is better not to predict, given the spontaneity of the Arab riots broke out so far. Much will also depend on Arab global context, understanding that after the substantial failure of the revolt Libyan military intervention in Saudi Arabia Bahrain atmosphere is not at all good. Indeed, there is a double risk: that Tunisia and Egypt remain the exceptions, and that they ignite process of regression (ie reactionary). But the future remains unpredictable.
